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COMMENTARY
LESSONS FROM THE PAST
FOR THE GENETIC FUTURE*
Simon A. Colet
The aim of this panel, on the occasion of Brooklyn Law
School's centennial, is to help us prepare for what might be
called "the genetic future" by taking a look at the past to see
what lessons history offers us. So I will begin by asking: what
was the state of biological identification a century ago? I hope
to make the answer to this question more relevant and
interesting by putting it into the context of local history, and I
will begin with a story that took place right here in New York
City.
In 1901, the year of the founding of Brooklyn Law
School, the New York newspapers reported a scandal: a man
named Mannix claimed that candidates for lucrative civil
service jobs in the police and fire departments had paid him to
take their civil service examinations in their place.' In this
manner, Mannix had taken the civil service exam twelve
times.2 (Interestingly, the scandal came to light only after
Mannix sued one his clients for failing to pay him for his
services.)' The City Civil Service Commission charged its newly
hired Chief Medical Examiner, Henry P. DeForest (who was
* ©2001 Simon A Cole. All Rights Reserved.
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Scientist, Cornell University.
1 Henry P. DeForest, Evolution of Dactlyloscopy in the United States, in





then practicing as an obstetrician in Brooklyn), with creating a
4system to prevent similar scams.
DeForest initially assumed that he would simply
implement what was widely regarded as the world's most
reliable system of personal identification: the Bertillon system.
Devised by the French police official Alphonse Bertillon, the
system determined identity using three measures: (1) the
lengths of body parts, such as head, finger, and even ear
lengths; (2) the careful description of facial features; and (3)
meticulous notations of what were called "peculiar marks,"
such as scars, birthmarks, and tattoos.5 In the spring of 1902,
however, a newspaper item from Britain caught DeForest's
eye. It reported that Scotland Yard had abandoned the
Bertillon system a year earlier in favor of a new method of
identification by fingerprints and that the Yard's detectives
had just used fingerprints to secure the conviction of one Harry
Jackson for the theft of some billiard balls.' Since he was
already planning to spend his summer bicycling through the
British Isles, DeForest decided to add Scotland Yard to his
itinerary in order to learn more about this new identification
system.7 There, DeForest was instructed in the recording and
filing of fingerprints by Inspector Charles Collins
When DeForest returned to New York in the fall, he
began taking inked fingerprints from civil service applicants.
Using the Yard's new system for filing fingerprint patterns,
DeForest could check an applicant's prints against his file to
see whether that individual had taken the exam on a previous
occasion using another name.' Thus, DeForest created the first
fingerprint file in the United States.0
4 Id. at 17.
ALPHONSE BERTILLON, INSTRUCTIONS FOR TAKING DESCRIPTIVES FOR THE
IDENTIFICATION OF CRIMINALS AND OTHERS BY THE MEANS OF ANTHROPOMETRIC
INDICATIONS (Gallus Muller trans., AMS Press 1977) (1889).




10 For more detail on this and other episodes in the history of criminal
identification, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING
AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION (2001).
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DeForest left the Civil Service Commission within a
year and settled into private practice, and the new
Commissioner discontinued his fingerprint file." The point I
want to emphasize here is that in 1901 fingerprinting was not
deemed reliable or scientific enough for the delicate task of
identifying criminals. For that, it was believed, nothing would
do better than the tried-and-tested Bertillon system.
Fingerprinting was good enough only for less important tasks,
like identifying civil service applicants. Even when the New
York State Prison Bureau instituted fingerprinting in 1903, it
was used only as a supplement to the Bertillon system for
identifying misdemeanants and other petty criminals." Serious
felons were still identified using the Bertillon system-and
would be until well into the 1920s." Only gradually did
fingerprinting win acceptance and become familiar enough to
be entrusted with the delicate task of identifying criminals.
As Jennifer Mnookin points out, it is now pretty clear
that this acceptance was not based on any sort of scientific
research or studies, but, rather, because fingerprinting looked
like science to judges.14 Professor Mnookin convincingly argues
that judges were anxious to employ what they viewed as
cutting edge sciences to ensure that the courts appeared
scientifically up-to-date." There is a nice example of this in one
of the earliest fingerprint trials in which the judge rebukes the
defense attorney for his attempts to dispute the fingerprint
evidence against his client by intoning: "Mr. Moore, this is a
new science. In our country our law cannot be like a pool,
permitted to become stagnant. It has to become flexible and we
have to advance in accordance with the times." 6
"DeForest, supra note 1, at 18.
121903 N.Y. PRISON DEP'T ANN. REP. 11-12.
13 Clara L. Parsons, Bertillon Measurements Discontinued Oct. 1, 1931 (1931)
(manuscript in historical records of the New York State Division of Criminal Justice
Services, Bureau of Identification).
" Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA Profiling,
67 BROOK. L. REV. 13 (2001).
'5 Jennifer L. Mnookin, Images of Truth: Evidence, Expertise, and
Technologies of Knowledge in the American Courtroom (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).
" Trial transcript at 152, People v. Crispi, (1911) (available in Special
Collections, Lloyd G. Sealy Library, John Jay College, City University of New York).
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Mnookin shows that fingerprinting fit an emerging late
nineteenth/early twentieth century conception of scientific
evidence as something that ought to be both more certain and
less subject to dispute than other types of evidence. Judges
were frustrated by the realization that scientific evidence,
much like eyewitness and character evidence, ended up with
"dueling witnesses" reaching opposite conclusions."
Fingerprint examiners, with their emphasis on consensus
among experts and their predilection for couching their
conclusions in terms of absolute certainty, fit this idealized
model of science very well."8 Indeed, I would argue that
fingerprint examiners, consciously or unconsciously, shaped
their discipline and its knowledge claims in order to fit this
ideal. Fingerprint identification, in contrast to many of the
other disciplines that are used as scientific evidence, was
forged in the courtroom and evolved to fit the needs of
courtroom testimony. Professor Mnookin discusses more fully
elsewhere the notion of the courtroom as an "epistemological
public space"--that is, an alternative forum in which a
discipline could establish its scientific legitimacy.1 9
One hundred years after the era when fingerprinting
was not reliable or scientific enough to use on real criminals, I
would suggest that we may be witnessing a similar techno-
scientific shift in criminal identification. I am talking, of
course, about the topic of this conference: DNA. Only a few
short years ago, I would not have believed that DNA would
ever displace fingerprint identification. Fingerprinting seemed
to have some decisive advantages: principally lower cost and
greater public trust. But in the last decade or so something
quite extraordinary has happened. Fingerprinting and DNA
appear to have almost reversed positions with regard to their
credibility. When DNA typing first came on the scene its
proponents frequently tried to compare it to fingerprinting-
essentially in order to draft behind the enormous public and
legal credibility that fingerprinting had built up over nearly a
century-even to the point of adopting its name: "DNA
:7 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 173-92.
18 See Simon A. Cole, Witnessing Identification: Latent Fingerprint Evidence
and Expert Knowledge, 28 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 687 (1998).
'9 Mnookin, supra note 15, at 192-200.
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fingerprinting."2" Opponents of DNA, meanwhile, tried to
disassociate it from fingerprinting, reminding juries and judges
that DNA provided only probabilistic matches, not the certain
identifications that fingerprinting could provide.2
Today, in contrast, most commentators have declared
the 'DNA wars" over-although there are many who still
contend there are problems with DNA evidence. Meanwhile,
fingerprinting is being challenged under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,22 and its progeny.' Much of the
argument against fingerprinting is based on an explicit
comparison to DNA. In contrast to the thoroughly debated
statistics attached to DNA matches, fingerprint matches are
still presented in court without any statistical probabilities
whatsoever. The protocols for DNA typing have been vigorously
debated; those for fingerprinting, to the extent they exist, are
vague and poorly articulated.
DNA testing is getting cheaper fast, so much so that it
may soon undermine fingerprinting's claim to lower cost.2A We
are rapidly approaching the point at which usable DNA
samples can be recovered from the biological material in a
latent fingerprint itself, thus erasing fingerprinting's final
advantage.' For all these reasons, it now seems conceivable to
me-I am not saying it is certain-that we will eventually
speak about fingerprinting in the past tense.
20 Interview by Michael Ruth McNally and Patrick Daly Lynch with Alec
Jeffreys, Leicester, UK. (July 24, 1996) (transcript in O.J. Simpson Murder Trial, DNA
Archive, Department of Science and Technology Studies, Cornell University).
21 Anne Joseph & Alison Winter, Making the Match: Human Traces, Forensic
Experts and the Public Imagination, in CULTURAL BABBAGE: TECHNOLOGY, TIME AND
INVENTION 196, 208 (Francis Spufford & Jenny Uglow eds., 1996).
2509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
David H. Kaye, DNA Data Bases for Law Enforcement: The Coverage
Question and the Case for a Population-Wide Data Base, Address at the Conference on
DNA and the Criminal Justice System (Nov. 21, 2000); see also David H. Kaye, Two
Fallacies About DNA Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK L. REV. 179 (2001).
See Ashira Zamir et al., Fingerprints and DNA- STR Typing of DNA




In making this suggestion, I want to refer back to one of
Professor Mnookin's lessons: that " 'culture' cannot be extric-
ated from determinations of expertise and reliability"26 and
that we tend to favor "form[s] of evidence [that] conformo] to
cultural expectations."27 It is not that DNA is more or less
scientific than fingerprinting. Rather, it is that DNA, with its
statistics and its laboratory protocols and its roots in molecular
biology, looks more like science to our modern sensibilities. We
are, after all, living in the genetic age.
If we are indeed embarking upon the genetic age, what
lessons might the past century of fingerprinting offer us? I
have already alluded to one: no matter how scientific
something looks to use, no forensic evidence should be placed
above scrutiny. But, although Professor Mnookin's focus has
been on forensic evidence, I want to discuss briefly some other
important issues raised by the record-keeping application of
fingerprinting-fingerprint data bases-which was, after all,
its primary use.
My first point concerns eugenics (and here I risk
overstepping my mandate and commenting on the Article by
our other panelist, Nicole Rafter28). The rise of genetic
identification has, of course, raised concerns about privacy and
eugenics, and you will hear about these elsewhere throughout
the Symposium. Briefly, the argument is this: the genetic
information used for criminal or civil identification is
potentially dangerous information. In addition to identifying
the individual, it also contains information about that
individual's race, heritage, disease propensities, and possibly
even behavioral propensities-such as a tendency toward
homosexuality or aggression.29 In this, DNA data bases are
supposed to be fundamentally different from fingerprint data
bases because fingerprints just identify-they do not contain
racial, hereditary, medical, or behavioral information.31 It is
2G Mnookin, supra note 14, at 69.
27 1d.
26 Nicole Hahn Rafter, Seeing and Believing: Images of Heredity in Biological
Theories of Crime, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 71 (2001).
29 Barry Steinhardt, ACLU Presentation on Privacy and Forensic DNA Data
Banks, Address at Conference on DNA and the Criminal Justice System, Cambridge,




important to note that this is not entirely true. A century ago,
it was widely believed that fingerprints did contain racial,
hereditary, medical, and behavioral information.3 Scientists
scrutinized the fingerprint patterns of primates, convicts,
mental patients, epileptics, and members of various racial
groups seeking to correlate certain pattern types with race,
criminality, evolutionary degeneration, epilepsy, insanity, and
so on.32 In rare cases, fingerprint patterns were actually used
as evidence in paternity cases.33 In short, the discourse around
fingerprints a century ago was strikingly similar to the
discourse surrounding DNA today.
In the interest of local history, I will give one example: a
fingerprint classification system devised by G. Tyler Mairs, a
fingerprint expert who worked at the Gates Avenue courthouse
in Brooklyn.34 This system purported to classify fingerprint
pattern types according to their true evolutionary order from
the least evolved pattern called "alpha," a concentric whorl, to
the most evolved pattern, "omega," a plain arch.35 In Mairs's
scheme, the whorl was the least evolved because it was the
most functional-the whorl functioned as a better tread for a
primate that walked on all fours." Humans, however, no longer
needed treads on their fingertips. Therefore, the pattern
evolved into a simple "patternless configuration" in which the
ridges cross straight across the bulb of the finger.3" Thus, the
simpler the pattern type, the further the evolutionary distance
from our primate ancestors. This fit nicely with research
findings that showed a greater proportion of arches among
Europeans than among other races." At the same time, though,
there was a rival school of thought that held just the opposite
31 COLE, supra note 10, at 97-118.
32 Id.
33 HAROLD CUMMINS & CHARLEs MIDLO, FINGER PRINTS, PALMS AND SOLES: AN
INTRODUCTION TO DERMATOGLYPHICS 210-13 (1943).
37 FINGER PRINT AND IDENTIFICATION MAGAZINE 7 (Sept. 1925).
35 Id. at 16-17.
36 Id.
37 id.
38 Kristine Bonnevie, Studies on Papillary Patterns of Human Fingers, 15 J. OF
GENETICS 1, 31 (1924).
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theory: that the whorl was the most evolved pattern, because it
was most complex, and the simple arch was the least evolved
pattern type."
Now here is where things get tricky: no one has ever
proved that fingerprint patterns do not correlate with race,
heritage, disease, and behavioral propensities. As far as
anyone knows, different pattern types do appear with different
frequencies among different populations. In fact, identical
twins' fingerprint patterns are more similar-whatever that
means-than those of non-identical twins. ° It is not that the
information contained in fingerprint patterns has no meaning.
Rather, it is that we eventually ceased to attribute meaning to
that information. Fingerprint patterns became only identifying
markers. The reason for this was twofold. First, scientists'
interest was attracted to other biological markers like the gene,
which was re-discovered almost exactly a century ago. Second,
the community of people interested in studying fingerprint
patterns became increasingly dominated by law enforcement
personnel who were more interested in identification and
record keeping than in diagnostics or criminology.
The danger of eugenics lies less in technology than in
ideology. It is not that one identification technology,
fingerprinting, does not lend itself to pernicious eugenic
interpretations and another identification technology, DNA,
does. Rather, the danger primarily lies in attaching
exaggerated importance to biological markers-of any kind. I
would argue that the best antidote to a resurgence of eugenics
in the criminal justice system based on DNA does not lie in
banning DNA data bases, a measure that has little chance of
success. It lies in refuting the oversimplistic interpretations of
genetic information, like the discussion of a putative "crime
gene," that would allow people to draw eugenic conclusions
from genetic information.
31 Charles F~r6, Notes sur les Mains et les Empreintes Digitales de Quelques
Singes, 36 JOURNAL DE L'ANATOMIE ET DE LA PHYSIOLOGIE NORMALES ET
PATHOLOGIQUES DE L'HOMME ET DES ANIMAUX 255, 260-62 (1900).
40 John Berry, Race Relationships, 2 FINGERPRINT WHORLD 48, 48-50 (1977);
C.H. Lin et al., Fingerprint Comparison I: Similarity of Fingerprints, 27 J. OF
FORENSIC SCI. 290, 290-304 (1982); E-mail from Andr6 Moenssens, Douglas Stripp
Professor of Law, Univ. of Missouri at Kansas City, to Dr. Anil Aggrawal and the
Forensic Newsgroup (Apr. 4, 2001) (on file with author).
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The history of fingerprinting may help define another
issue that faces us as we confront the genetic future: the
universal data base. Here we return to our old friend Henry
DeForest. Whatever happened to him? In 1919, as
fingerprinting began to eclipse the Bertillon system as the
world's dominant method of criminal identification, he-along
with his friend Tyler Mairs, mentioned above, and other like-
minded fingerprint enthusiasts-founded the International
Society for Personal Identification ("ISPI")." In contrast to the
International Association for Identification ("IAI"), a rival
association primarily composed of law enforcement personnel
who work in fingerprint identification and other areas of
forensics which still exists today, the ISPI envisioned a broader
role for fingerprinting in society. In particular, ISPI members
believed that fingerprinting should not be restricted to
criminals. Instead, they advocated what they called "universal
identification" of all "law abiding citizens."
The universal fingerprinting movement, begun by
DeForest and others, gained momentum during the 1930s,
when J. Edgar Hoover lent it some added force. Cities
conducted enormous fingerprint drives and convinced
hundreds of thousands of citizens to voluntarily register their
own-and in many cases their children's-fingerprints out of
civic duty and fear of amnesia or kidnapping."3
In the end, however, the universal fingerprinting
movement fizzled, done in by the "criminal stigma" already
attached to fingerprinting. Being fingerprinted made people
feel like they were being treated like criminals." The idea of
legally requiring all citizens to register their fingerprints,
meanwhile, died for good in 1943 when Congress defeated a bill
mandating universal fingerprinting and declined to attach
fingerprints to the newly created social security card."5
41 Records of the International Society for Personal Identification, Henry P.
DeForest Papers, Collection #3214, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Carl
A- Kroch Library, Cornell University, Box 6, Folder 5.
42Id.
4AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THUMBS DOWN!: THE FINGER-
PRINT MENACE TO CIVIL LIBERTIES (1938).
44 INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, IDENTIFICATION
WANTED: DEVELOPMENT OF THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM 1893-
1943 at 110 (Donald C. Dilworth ed., 1977).
41 Id. at 228.
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Thus, Americans have once before considered the
question of the scope of their criminal identification data base,
and they chose to safeguard the privacy of law-abiding citizens,
although not that of convicts. We should note that despite the
enthusiasm for universal fingerprinting, it probably would
have been technically infeasible during the 1930s or 1940s. In
the near future, however, we will probably have good reason to
consider this question anew: what should be the scope of our
criminal identification data base?
History teaches that technological advances in
identification tend to broaden the scope of data bases. The
Bertillon system was expensive and time-consuming and,
therefore, confined to serious felons. Fingerprinting, which was
cheaper, extended data bases to those convicted even of petty
misdemeanors. Computerized fingerprint data bases, which are
cheaper still (or possibly DNA as the cost goes down), have the
potential to extend those data bases to all arrestees, or even all
citizens. Our main concern, I believe, should be that as data
bases expand, they become more sensitive to racial and
geographic biases in arrest patterns, policing practices, and the
criminal justice system, because the occasion for inputting the
individual into the data base has become pettier-and
therefore more subject to discretion. 4' The alternative, of
course, would be either to limit DNA data bases to, for
example, convicted violent felons, or to consider seriously
whether we want a universal identification data base.
The history of fingerprinting will not give us easy
answers to these questions, but as we embark on the genetic
age we should look not only forward but also backward to
understand what the past century of biologically-based
identification might have to teach us about the next.
4G See Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in
Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127
(2001).
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